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 The Supreme Court and the Miller Case: More Reasons Why the UK Needs a 
Written Constitution 
 






7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQLVREVFXUHDQGRSHQWH[WXUHG The powers of the 
state are vested in the Crown which is subject to diverse and contradictory 
interpretations of its identity. The obscurity of the UK constitution is dysfunctional 
and needs to be reformed by way of a written constitution. The shortcomings of the 
8.¶VXQZULWWHQFRPPRQODZFRQVWLWXWLRQLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
majority judgment in the 2017 Miller case.1 The common law constitution makes the 
judges the constituent power and especially vulnerable to criticism when dealing with 
intensely disputed political matters. In the absence of a written constitution the 
Supreme Court may lack institutional confidence in its role and authority and seek to 
portray its decisions as merely technical applications of the law rather than assertions 
of creative and active constitutional law making. A written constitution would be an 
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that are fundamentally obscure and open textured. The powers of the state are vested 
in the Crown but the Crown itself is subject to diverse and contradictory 
interpretations of its identity. For example, is the Crown a corporation sole or a 
corporation aggregate or both?2 The Queen is the embodiment of the Crown and in 
strict legal theory the powers of the state are hers. In practice, most of those powers 
are exercised by the government of the day. Although not overtly directing policy the 
monarch has a significant role in government as a non-executive head of state, seeing 
state papers and holding regular audiences with her Prime Minister and other leading 
ministers. The monarch possesses so called reserve powers where there is a need for 
her to step in in a situation where there is a significant impasse that the normal 
political process cannot resolve. A head of state possessing reserve powers is 
constitutionally sensible but in the UK context of an unwritten constitution those 
reserve powers are uncertain and likely to be contentious where a hereditary monarch 
LVLQWHUYHQLQJLQDSROLWLFDOFULVLV7KHXQFHUWDLQVFRSHRIWKHPRQDUFK¶VSRZHUVLQ
                                                 
1
 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 
UKSC 5 
2
 For a detailed elaboration of the conceptual issues relating to the Crown and its identity see 
Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (eds) (1999) The Nature of the Crown. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 terms of her political authority is matched by an inverse issue with regard to the 
government of the day: what are the limits of its legal authority when acting under the 
powers of the Crown with regard to the royal prerogative? 
The main proposition this article advances is that the obscurity of the UK 
constitution is dysfunctional and needs to be reformed by way of a written 
constitutioQ7KHVKRUWFRPLQJVRIWKH8.¶VXQZULWWHQFRQVWLWXWLRQ (the common law 
constitution) can be seen in many contexts but here I focus on WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
majority judgment in the 2017 Miller case to illustrate my central proposition.3 My 
criticisms of that judgment are not intended as an attack on the judges but are directed 
towards identifying the structural problems that flow from having an obscure 
constitution that depends upon the judiciary to piece together. Those structural 
problems become especially acute when the courts have to deal with a matter that is 
divisive, politically sensitive and demanded to be answered at short notice. The 
common law constitution makes the judges the body that defines the constitution and 
so in effect the constituent power. This makes the judiciary especially vulnerable to 
criticism when dealing with intensely disputed political matters. In the absence of a 
written constitution designating the role of a top constitutional court, the Supreme 
Court may lack institutional confidence in its role and authority and seek to portray its 
decisions as merely technical applications of the law rather than assertions of creative 
and active constitutional law making.  
The Miller case provides an excellent basis to assess the operation of the 
constitution under pressure: the subject matter touched on key elements of power in 
the state, namely, the role and power of the executive, the legislature and the judges. 
The method of divination of those powers is through the judges who use an 
assortPHQWRIVWUDWHJLHV7KHVKRUWFRPLQJVRIWKLVµPHWKRG¶ZHUHHYLGHQWLQWKHMiller 
case. With regard to the constitutional background, tKHPDMRULW\¶V reasoning seems 
doubtful or plain wrong in places and the way in which the devolution issue was 
dismissed reveals a reluctance to look at the constitution as an integrated whole. 
 
What was the Miller case about? 
After the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU) in a referendum held on 23 
June 2016 the Conservative Government wished to give effect to that vote by 
notifying the European Council of its intention to withdraw under Article 50 of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
Article 50 (1) says: 
 
Any member state may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with 
its own constitutional requirement.  
 
Article 50 (3) says that the Treaties of the European Union will cease to apply to 
the member state from the date of the withdrawal agreement, or failing that after two 
years unless the European Council and the member state unanimously decide to 
extend this period. Notwithstanding that one of the key arguments of those in favour 
of leaving the European Union was about the sovereignty of parliament, the 
government did not want to get the permission of parliament to serve the Notice by 
way of an authorising Act of Parliament. Instead they proposed to use the royal 
prerogative to give notice. The key issue in this case was whether the royal 
prerogative extended to giving notice to leave the EU. The giving of notice would 
                                                 
3
 Miller (see note 1) 
 lead to the EU Treaties no longer applying thereby, arguably, terminating an extensive 
legal order, namely EU law, which had been applicable and binding in the UK. The 
UK is a dualist state with regard to international treaties; the European Communities 
Act 1972 was the means by which EU law was made effective domestically. That Act 
said, in effect, apply EU law in all its forms as required by the EU Treaties. 
Crucial to the case was an interpretation of what the 1972 Act was doing: was it a 
mere channel or conduit to put into effect whatever flowed from the treaty obligations 
OR did it do something more, namely, introduce a new and binding legal order 
thereby transforming the legal structures of the state? Related to this was the question 
of whether a royal prerogative could effectively terminate the contents of an act of 
parliament and demolish a legal order? The government disputed this interpretation of 
the effect of giving notice, claiming that the 1972 Act would be unchanged until 
repealed and that all the Act was doing was implementing whatever Treaty 
obligations existed. 
The other key element in this case related to the devolution arrangements in the 
UK, dating to 1998, and put in place by acts of the UK parliament. The devolved 
assemblies and executives had limited competence: one legal obligation being to 
apply EU law and not to act or legislate contrary to that body of EU law. As the 
devolution arrangements developed an understanding or convention had arisen that 
the UK government would not normally legislate on devolved matters without the 
consent of the devolved legislatures. This was called the Sewel Convention and it had 
been enshrined in law in the Scotland Act 2016. The question that arose in the Miller 
case was whether the agreement of the devolved legislatures was needed prior to the 
giving of notice to the EU because the effect of giving notice would change devolved 
competencies. In other words, leaving the EU would have an effect on the devolved 
bodies because it would change the legislative requirement imposed on them by UK 
law, in for example the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Scotland Acts, to act and 
legislate consistently with EU law. 
The majority decision in Miller (eight of the judges, with the remaining three 
dissenting) was that the prerogative power relating to treaty making did not extend to 
this scenario of giving notice to withdraw from the EU because to do so would 
undermine provisions embodied in an act of parliament. They said that an act of 
parliament was needed to authorise the notice to leave. The court dismissed the 
devolution arguments on the basis that the Sewel Convention was merely a political 
understanding and not law. 
 
The Constitutional Background  
A crucial part of the cRXUW¶VMXGJPHQWLVWKHLUVHFWLRQRQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOEDFNJURXQG




At paragraph 40 of the judgment the majority state: µUnlike most countries, the 
United Kingdom does not have a constitution in the sense of a single coherent code of 
fundamental law which prevails over all oWKHUVRXUFHVRIODZ¶ That statement is true, 
albeit an understatement. What the UK has is a multitude of precepts of varying status, 
which do not form a coherent whole. The so-called constitutional principles or 
precepts may or may not be applied as law depending upon what the court feels at any 
RQHWLPHLVWKHµULJKWDQVZHU¶ Indeed, the court quotes Dicey as saying that the UK 
 constitution was µthe most flexible SROLW\LQH[LVWHQFH¶The Court goes on to say at 
paragraph 41: 
 
Originally sovereignty was concentrated in the Crown «Accordingly the Crown 
largely exercised all the powers of the state «+RZHYHU «WKRse prerogatives powers 
«ZHUHprogressively reduced as parliamentary democracy and the rule of law 
developed. 
 
This potted history by the majority judges can be called the Whig account of 
history suggesting evolution and progress but what should be noted is that the powers 
of the state in the UK are still exercised by the Crown though, for the large part by 
ministers and not by the monarch in person. (As mentioned already, the Queen does 
retain reserve powers and the powers of a head of state). Furthermore, key 
governmental attributes, held by virtue of the prerogative, remained in the hands of 
the Crown until this century and still do with some recent limitations.4  
The majority proceed to describe the role of judges in dealing with cases. At 
paragraph 42 they say: 
 
[j]udges impartially identify and apply the law in every case brought before the courts. 
That is why and how these proceedings are being decided.  
 
This particular assertion is noteworthy in so far as it seeks to give new life to a 
doctrine, the declaratory theory of justice, that has long been regarded by many as a 
fantasy or, as Lord Reid famously described it, µa fairy tale¶. In the Miller case, the 
courts are being asked to determine the extent of the royal prerogative in an entirely 
novel situation. To curtail the treaty prerogative in this novel situation the majority 
judges are making up a new rule. I do not regard making up a new rule as a problem 
but the majority in the Supreme Court is keen to pretend that they are not doing so.  
At paragraph 43 they state: 
 
The legislative power of the Crown is today only exercisable through Parliament. 
This power is initiated by the laying of a Bill containing a proposed law before 
Parliament«7KXV3DUOLDPHQWRUPRUHSUHFLVHO\WKH&URZQLQ3DUOLDPHQWOD\V
down the law through statutes ± or primary legislation as it is also know ± and not in 
any other way.  
 
It may seem surprising to say but their statement is false in so far as it suggests that 
the only way to create primary legislation is through acts of parliament. Orders in 
Council issued by the Privy Council, as well as creating statutory instruments by way 
of an authorising act of parliament, also create prerogative legislation.5 The source of 
authority to creaWHVXFKSUHURJDWLYH2UGHUVLVµthe Crown outwith Parliament¶. In the 
GCHQ case6 such prerogative Orders were referred to as primary legislation. In that 
case Lord Fraser said: 
                                                 
4
 See the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 for changes to the status of 
the civil service and the requirement to seek parliamentary approval before the 
ratification of treaties. 
5
 For a discussion of this see Andrew Le Sueur, Maurice Sunkin and Jo Murkens 
(2016) Public Law: Texts, Cases and Materials. 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 465.  
6
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
  
The Order in Council of 1982 was described by Sir Robert Armstrong in his first 
affidavit as primary legislation; that is, in my opinion, a correct description, subject to 
the qualification that the Order in Council, being made under the prerogative, derives 
its authority from the sovereign alone and not, as is more commonly the case with 
legislation, from the sovereign in Parliament.7  
 
Indeed the Chagos Island case (Bancoult No. 2),8 involved the use of Orders in 
Council under the royal prerogative to remove the whole population of the Chagos 
Islands, against their will and dump them in the slums of Port Louis in Mauritius so 
that the USA could build a military base on the Chagos Islands. As well as 
reaffirming that Orders in Council are primary legislation, the court in Bancoult 
(No.2) DIILUPHGWKH)RUHLJQ6HFUHWDU\¶VSRZHUWRUHPRYHDZKROHSRSXODWLRQE\DFWRI
the royal prerogative. This more recent case demonstrated the potency of such 
prerogative legislative acts, not least for transforming for the worse the lives of a 
whole population. 
Later in the judgment in Miller, at paragraph 46, the majority do mention, in 
passing, a limited power of the prerogative to regulate. But their qualification is 
somewhat misleading. They say at paragraph 52, 
 
The fact that the exercise of the prerogative powers cannot change the domestic law 
does not mean that such an exercise is always devoid of domestic legal consequences. 
 
This analysis is doubtful. Orders in Council issued under the prerogative can create 
law and so in that sense change the law. To support their proposition that prerogatives 
cannot change the law, the majority give two examples, one of which is, 
 
[t]he Crown has a prerogative power to decide on the terms of service of its servants, 
and it is inherent in that power that the Crown can alter those terms so as to remove 
rights. 
 
That was an accurate account but the court appears to have forgotten that the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 put the regulation of the civil 
service on to a statutory footing.9 Notwithstanding that omission with regard to recent 
legislation, it is strange that the court thinks that the power of the Crown to issue 
orders in council under the prerogative to change the terms of employment of civil 
servants so as to remove rights is not to change the law.  
The Court, at paragraph 52, refers to a second category where prerogatives can 
KDYHµFRQVHTXHQFHV¶DVWKHFRXUWSXts it (whilst maintaining the idea that prerogatives 
cannot change domestic law). The Court attempts to bolster their interpretation with 
reference to authority. At paragraph 53 they say: 
 
                                                 
7
 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (see note 6), per 
Lord Fraser, p. 399 at C. 
8
 R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61. 
9
 Under the 2010 Act there were exceptions to the application of the statutory scheme 
for the security and intelligence services, the Northern Ireland Civil Service and civil 
servants overseas. 
 Likewise, in Post Office and Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740 the CrowQ¶V
exercise of its prerogative to extend UK territorial waters resulted in the 
criminalisation of broadcasts from ships in the extended area, which had been 
previously lawful. 
 
This related to radio stations operating from ships outside territorial waters. The 
Court says: 
 
[T]he exercise has not created or changed the law, merely the extent of its application. 
 
Apparently turning lawful actions into criminal ones, at the stroke of an executive 
pen, is not to change the law. It appears that the court is conflating the accepted 
principle that prerogative cannot be used to over-ride statute with the idea that 
prerogatives do not change the domestic law.  
 
Devolution and Conventions 
Since the majority of the court had concluded that legislation was needed prior to the 
giving of notice under Article 50, they had to address the arguments put to them with 
regard to that legislation and the Sewel Convention and the Scotland Act 2016. The 
relevant submissions were that the agreement of the devolved bodies had to be 
obtained by way of legislative consent motions since the devolved competencies 
would be inevitably affected by legislation permitting the giving of notice.  
Devolution is a key part of the UK constitution but the legal arguments in relation 
to the Sewel Convention and the fact that it had been written into the Scotland Act 
2016 were dismissed by the court. They said that the Sewel Convention was merely a 
political convention operative only in the political sphere. At paragraph 148 they say 
that the fact the Sewel convention was put into the Scotland Act 2016 did not mean 
that parliament was converting it into a rule, which could be interpreted by a court. 
The cRXUWVDLGWKDWWKH6FRWODQG$FWZDVVLPSO\µUHFRJQLVLQJWKHFRQYHQWLRQIRU
what it is, nameO\DSROLWLFDOFRQYHQWLRQ¶DQGGHFODULQJLWDSHUPDQHQWIHDWXUHRIWKH
devolution settlement. The approach of the court represents a refusal to give 
constitutional weight to the structure of the UK as a devolved union of separate 
nations. The reason why the Sewel Convention was put into the Scotland Act 2016 
was to underline its constitutional significance ± and such a commitment had been 
used by the UK government to encourage the Scottish electorate to vote in favour of 
the union in the Scottish referendum.  
The Supreme Court, b\UHIXVLQJWRHQJDJHZLWKWKH8.¶s devolution settlement as 
a major constitutional feature of the UK and in effect saying that conventions were 
nothing to do with the role of a court, were implying that their role was passive, 
merely identifying what the law is and applying it or, supposedly, identifying 
something as non-law and ignoring it. By contrast the court made frequent references 
throughout their judgment to parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and 
constitutional principles to bolster their preferred answer to the legal issues. Those 
principles are not law any more than conventions are but that did not stop the court 
from using them as essential building blocks to reaching their decision. The court did 
not say with regard to those SULQFLSOHVµWKHVH are not laws so we will not apply them¶. 
The stance adopted by the court with regard to conventions ignored the structural 
similarities between what the courts do with regard to prerogatives and what some 
courts have done with regard to conventions: namely interpret the concept, state the 
scope of it and apply it in making their decision. Of course, prerogatives have features 
 that are distinct from conventions but courts have played an active role with regard to 
both those concepts. 
 
Conventions 
In the majority judgment the court gives a particular meaning to a convention as an 
established practice in the political sphere which is not enforceable by the court. But 
that definition makes an assumption that begs the very question to be decided, namely 
the status of a convention vis-a-vis a court. It is a proposition that is only true by 
definition but is not a valid conclusion of a logical argument.10 The cRXUW¶VUHDGLQJRI
conventions is very limited and does not acknowledge that changing practices and 
realities do influence the court. A hypothetical scenario can illustrate this. The war 
prerogative is exercised by the prime minister and not the monarch. It is a convention 
that the prime minister takes that decision. A judicial review of the exercise of the war 
prerogative based on the fact that the prime minister took the decision rather than the 
monarch would be immediately dismissed. Aside from any justiciability question, a 
FRXUWZRXOGQRWVD\µWKLVLVDQXQDXWKRULVHGH[HUFLVHRISower because the prime 
mLQLVWHUWRRNWKHGHFLVLRQ¶ The convention has been embedded into the lawfulness of 
the decision making by the prime minister and courts would give effect to that. 
Conventional factors, or at least a changing view of what is appropriate, are exactly 
what has influenced courts in their determination of the limits of the prerogative. A 
line of authority, subjecting the prerogative to increased judicial oversight, has 
responded to a changing sense of what is politically appropriate and those 
determinations equal the law. Whereas the decisions are part of the common law what 
influenced the decisions were changes in the culture of society and politics. For 
instance, in the GCHQ FDVHWKHFRXUWUHMHFWHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWHQWLRQ
that prerogatives were unreviewable and that the Crown could change the terms and 
conditions of its civil servants at will. The common law device deployed was 
legitimate expectation but that recently developed principle must have been in 
response to a changing sense of the limitations on the appropriate exercise of public 
power. The decision in that the case was ultimately determined by a security related 
element, which exceptionally ousted the legitimate expectation.  
Some of the reasoning of the court in the Miller case seems disingenuous in its 
desire to emphasise its political neutrality. At paragraph 146 they say: 
 
Judges therefore are neither parents nor the guardians of political conventions; they 
are merely observers. As such, they can recognise the operation of a political 
convention in the context of deciding a legal question (as in the Crossman diaries 
case ± A.G. v Jonathan Cape Ltd [1976] 1 QB 752), but they cannot give legal ruling 
on its operation or scope, because those matters are determined within the political 
world.11 
 
If one reads the Jonathan Cape case it is unambiguously clear that it is the court 
that is determining whether cabinet documents are covered by confidentiality arising 
from a convention of collective cabinet responsibility. In that case there was a dispute 
as to what the convention was, both sides calling on leading politicians to support 
their view. It was left to the judge to determine the scope and meaning of the 
convention. The court was clearly not a mere observer. Lord Chief Justice Widgery 
concluded that the Attorney General had made out his claim that confidentiality 
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 The court is committing the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. 
11
 Miller (see note 1), [146]. 
 applied because µthe doctrine of joint responsibility within the cabinet is in the public 
interest, and the application of that doctrine might be prejudiced by premature 
disclosure of thHYLHZVRILQGLYLGXDO0LQLVWHUV¶. In this case the judge did refuse an 
injunction because the information was sufficiently old as not to require it. It is clear 
from the judgment that the judge is determining what the convention is, its scope and 
the legal effect of it. None of which you would know from the Supreme CRXUW¶V
reference to it in the Miller case. 
 
Common Law Constitutionalism 
In an interesting work by Masterman and Wheatle entitled Unity, Disunity and 
Vacuity,12 the authors examine common law constitutionalism in the UK and 
VSHFLILFDOO\µWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGGHSOR\PHQWE\WKHFRXUWVRIVSHFLILFDQG
VXEVWDQWLYHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWVDQGSULQFLSOHV¶13. The authors identify a lack of 
specificity and detail implicit in common law constitutionalism, for example, they 
say:14 
 
Yet common law rights are ± by their very nature ± lacking in the definitional 
certainty of rights allocated under a Bill of Rights or other legislative instrument. 
Whatever vagueness persists in the definition of each right guaranteed in a Bill of 
Rights, courts can be more sure-footed by reliance on both the wording of the 
rights provisions and the context of the overall instrument.   
 
A key part of their analysis is that the growth of constitutional type reasoning 
threatens the unity of the common law method and the legitimacy of judicial decision 
PDNLQJµ2XUFRQFHUQLVWKDWVHHNLQJWRVXEVWDQWLDWH± and enforce ± principle based 
constitutionalist reasoning holds the potential to undermine the stability of the 
FRPPRQODZDQGWKHUHIRUHLWVOHJLWLPDF\¶15 They note that courts need to provide 
µIXOO\UHDVRQHGDQGVXSSRUWHGGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ¶16  Implicit in their comment is the 
failure by the courts to supply this. Fully reasoned and supported decision making 
should be an essential requirement of all judgments but my contention here is that the 
courts have great difficulty providing this in constitutional cases because of the 
obscurity of the UK constitution and also for the reason that Masterman and Wheatle 
identify:17 µThe external constraint imposed by parliamentary sovereignty is perhaps a 
more serious indicator of potential inconsistencies between common law 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶VDVFHQGHQF\DQGORQJVWDQGLQJFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSLOODUV¶  
0DVWHUPDQDQG:KHDWOH¶VSUHIHUUHd solution to the disunity they see emerging 
from the tension between modern constitutionalism with the common law is for an 
DSSURDFKWKH\FKDUDFWHULVHDVµVXVWDLQHGLQFUHPHQWDOLVP¶7KLVZRXOGFRQVLVWRI
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 Roger Masterman and Se-shauna Wheatle (2018) Unity, Disunity and Vacuity, 
Constitutional Adjudication and the Common Law, in M. Elliot, J.N. Varuhas and S. 
Wilson Stark (eds) The Unity of Public Law? Doctrinal, Theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives, Oxford UK; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, pp. 123±148. 
13
 Masterman and Wheatle (see note 12 ), p. 123, footnote 2. 
14
 Masterman and Wheatle (see note 12), p. 128.  
15
 Masterman and Wheatle (see note 12), p. 143. 
16
 Masterman and Wheatle (see note 12), p. 143. 
17
 Masterman and Wheatle (see note 12), p. 131. I would note here that the Miller case 
LVDQH[DPSOHRIWKHILUVWW\SHRISUREOHPREVFXULW\DVWKHPDMRULW\¶VFRQFOXVLRQZDV
that the sovereignty of parliament prevailed.  
 developing the law on a piecemeal basis, in accordance with the common law method, 
whilst requiring the judges to add greater depth to their constitutional reasoning in 
particular cases. This, apparently, would allow the judges to reconcile conflicting 
concepts whilst not overstepping their authority as the non-elected branch of 
government.18  
For my part, I do not agree with their overall conclusion on how to deal with the 
disunity that they have identified. Constitutionalism clashes with the notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty with its implication that anything goes so long as 
parliament has authorised it. In essence, the body of existing constitutional 
expectations and legal structures that the courts depend upon (in particular the 
sovereignty of parliament, the royal prerogative and the Crown) are on a collision 
course with modern constitutionalism where it seeks to curtail executive power by 




The Supreme Court was under pressure in the Miller case. The Government had made 
plain that they wanted to trigger Article 50 by March 2017. The Court allowed itself 
to be intimidated into a rushed timetable that did not allow itself time to think through 
the issues with care. The court was also clearly on the defensive after the terrible press 
attacks on the divisional court when that court delivered its judgment in the Miller 
case. The majority judgment in the Supreme Court looks as if it was stitched together 
by a committee with rushed research by judicial assistants.  
The common law approach looks very unsatisfactory especially when the court is 
under pressure and lacks confidence to assert its role as the top constitutional court of 
WKHFRXQWU\7KHIXQGDPHQWDOREVFXULW\RIWKH8.¶VQRQ-constitution with the 
accompanying paraphernalia of the Crown and the prerogative must have contributed 
to the lack of precision in the judgment and its failure to offer a compelling and 
integrated constitutional analysis.  
I would suggest that the biggest improvement to be made would be for the UK to 
have a written constitution that identifies what are the key concepts and principles of 
the constitution. A written constitution that defined the powers of a supreme court and 
enshrined its status and independence would arguably empower a supreme court to act 
with confidence and set its own timetable when being harassed by politicians and the 
press. A written constitution would encourage the judges to think in deep terms about 
the constitutional structure of the country and give effect to that analysis in their 
judgments.  
On one analysis the court in Miller could have upheld the Sewel Convention as 
embodied in the Scotland Act 2016 but that would have given a potential veto to the 
devolved institutions on the decision to trigger Article 50. Even if that had been a 
reasonable judicial decision to reach it seems unlikely the court would have had the 
confidence to reach that decision given the political paralysis it would have caused. 
This provides another good reason to have a written constitution: to define properly 
the constitutional status of the devolution settlement in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty ultimately gives maximum 
authority to the executive that controls parliament. A written constitution would 
replace that doctrine with The Constitution as the fundamental set of guiding 
principles. 
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 Masterman and Wheatle (see note 12), pp. 43±147. 
 Attacks on the judiciary for over-stepping their authority will always be a risk 
when the courts have to rule on politically sensitive matters. The more assertive the 
judges are in advancing those constitutional principles, the more vulnerable the 
judiciary is to attack, both crass and sophisticated, on the grounds that they are 
overstepping their role, usurping democracy and taking over from parliament, or 
taking upon themselves the role of policy entrusted to the executive. That type of 
attack is made much more likely by the common law constitution because, by its 
nature, the primary construction of the constitution falls to the judges. By contrast, a 
written constitution would transform the position of the courts because they would not 
be the constituent power that had constructed the constitution. The constituent power 
would be those groups that had drafted the constitution and had authorised it ± the 
people, a constituent assembly, parliament or whatever configuration is decided upon. 
Under a written constitution the courts would be interpreting a constitution that they 
had not created. 
The current constitutional dispensation is obscure and open textured so as to be 
amenable to opposite and contrary interpretations. A written constitution does not 
immunise the judiciary from criticism nor does it remove the need for interpretation 
but the absence of a written constitution creates structural and interpretative problems 
that this article has attempted to indicate. The fact that countries with written 
constitutions may have bad governments that abuse their powers is not a very 
convincing argument against the UK having a written constitution. The political and 
cultural factors that condition respect for the rule of law in the UK would be elements 
that would make fidelity to a written constitution all the more likely.  
What a written constitution can do is locate the authority and role of each branch of 
government and the means by which that role can be upheld and limited. A written 
constitution would be an opportunity to design an integrated and coherent body of 
constitutional law drawing on over two hundred years of constitution making from 
across the globe and the common law world assisted by comparative constitutional 
scholarship and the practical experience of governments and lawmakers.  
